Belin v. Litton Loan

[David A. Szwak]

Belin v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP
Slip Copy, 2006 WL 1992410
M.D.Fla.,2006.
Jul 14, 2006
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D. Ms. Daffron's and Ms. Belin's Standing
*6 Next, Defendants argue that Ms. Daffron and Ms. Belin's claims should be dismissed, because they lack standing. Specifically, Defendants argue that to the extent that Ms. Daffron and Ms. Belin are attempting to assert claims for violations of §§ 1692c, 1692e, 1692f, 1692g, and 1692h of the FDCPA and any violations of the FCCPA, they lack standing to assert such claims. Plaintiffs appear to concede that Ms. Daffron and Ms. Belin lack standing to assert claims for violations of § 1692c, since such claims can only be asserted by consumers, which is defined [FN4] as a natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay the debt and includes [FN5] the consumer's spouse, parent (if the consumer is a minor), guardian, executor, or administrator. Since Plaintiffs appear to concede that Ms. Daffron and Ms. Belin are not consumers, they cannot assert claims for violations of § 1692c.


FN4. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3)



FN5. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(d)


Plaintiffs' response, however, is unclear as to which of the plaintiffs are asserting which claims for violations of §§ 1692e, 1692f, 1692g, and 1692h of the FDCPA and violations of the FCCPA. To further complicate matters, Defendants only cite case law regarding standing to sue for violations of §§ 1692c and 1692e(11) of the FDCPA and for violations of the FCCPA. Accordingly, the Court will only further address standing with respect to claims for violations of § 1692e(11) of the FDCPA and for violations of the FCCPA. [FN6]


FN6. The Court notes that Plaintiffs also assert claims for violations of § 1692d, which can be brought by any person, not just consumers. As such, Ms. Daffron and Ms. Belin have standing to pursue claims for violations of § 1692d.


Furthermore, since Defendants have not submitted case law on the issue of standing to pursue claims for violations of §§ 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(7), 1692f, 1692g, and 1692h, the Court denies Defendants' motion without prejudice to they extent that they argue that Ms. Daffron and Ms. Belin lack standing to pursue these claims. Defendants can raise the standing issue again in a motion for summary judgment with appropriate citations to authority. If Defendants do make such a motion, Plaintiffs are directed to include in their response an explanation as to which of the plaintiffs are asserting which claims.
1. § 1692e(11)
Absent a limitation in the provisions within § 1692e, the general rule is that any party may bring a claim for a violation of § 1692e. See Wright v. Finance Service of Norwalk, Inc., 22 F.3d 647, 649-50 (6th Cir.1994); Montgomery v. Huntington Bank, 346 F.3d 693, 697 (6th Cir.2003). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated § 1692e(11). Defendants argue that claims for violations of § 1692e(11) can only be brought by consumers. Specifically, Defendants cite Conboy v. AT & T Corp., 241 F.3d 242, 257 (2d Cir.2001), in which the court found that only consumers, defined as a natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay the debt, have standing to bring a claim based on § 1692e(11). Since Ms. Daffron and Ms. Belin are not consumers under the FDCPA, they do not have standing to pursue a § 1692e(11) claim. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants' motion to the extent that they argue that Ms. Daffron and Ms. Belin lack standing to pursue a § 1692e(11) claim.
2. FCCPA
*7 The FCCPA provides that a debtor may bring a civil action against a person who commits a prohibited act, as set forth in Florida Statute § 559.72, while collecting consumer debts. Fla. Stat. § 559.77(1). A debtor is defined by the FCCPA as a natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay a debt. Fla. Stat. § 559.55(2). Since Ms. Daffron and Ms. Belin are not alleged to be obligated to pay the loan, they are not debtors under the FCCPA, and they do not have standing to pursue claims for violations of the FCCPA. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants' motion to the extent that they argue that Ms. Daffron and Ms. Belin lack standing to pursue claims for violations of the FCCPA.